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COMMEMORATIVE ESSAYS
delivered his celebrated address on "High Altitude Flight and National
Sovereignty," we have, appropriately, the article "The International As-
tronautical Federation and the Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes" by Dr.
Antonio Francoz Rigalt. In a related vein, is the contribution from Dr.
Victor J. Delascio, of Venezuela, entitled "Space Explorations and Space
Law." One might almost hear the forensic voice of Maitre Andr6 Garnault,
of Paris, France, come from the article entitled "Liability of the Gratuitous
Air Carrier Under French Law." Dr. Julian Gazdik, close associate of
Professor Cooper in IATA, gives us a close analysis of an important prob-
lem in "The Conflicts and State Obligations Under the Warsaw Con-
vention, the Hague Protocol and the Guadalajara Convention." Last, but
not least, we have an article from Yugoslavia by Dr. Michel Smirnoff on
the "Legal Status of Celestial Bodies."
This introduction and these articles constitute offerings made in great
esteem and with affection to Professor John Cooper to commemorate a
special occasion. It is hoped they will please him.
EXEMPTION CLAUSES GOVERNING LOSS OR DAMAGE
RESULTING FROM THE INHERENT DEFECT,
QUALITY OR VICE OF THE CARGO
By HUIBERT DRiONt
T HE Hague Conference of 1955, which adopted the Protocol to the
Warsaw Convention, has added a new paragraph 2 to Article 23 of
the Convention. According to Article 23 "any provision tending to re-
lieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid
down in this convention shall be null and void." The new paragraph
added by The Hague Protocol provides that "paragraph 1 of this Article
shall not apply to provisions governing loss or damage resulting from the
inherent defect, quality or vice of the cargo carried."
The drafting history of this new provision may be traced back to the
(1953) Rio Session of the Legal Committee of ICAO, which preceded
The Hague Conference. This history is instructive of some of the "in-
herent defects" of international conferences on legal matters, and for
that reason it deserves to be studied in some detail. One cannot ignore
the drafting history when trying to determine the meaning of the some-
what "cabalistic" formula-to borrow a qualification used by one of its
supporters-by which the Warsaw Convention was enriched.
At the Rio Conference, the United Kingdom delegate (Wilberforce)
proposed that a provision be inserted in the new Convention. It concerned
the air carriers' liability as envisaged at that stage of the discussions. The
provision read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 17(1) [being a somewhat re-
drafted Article 23] or any other provision of this Convention, for the car-
riage of live animals, perishable goods or fragile articles, the carrier shall be
entitled to provide in the agreement to carry that he shall not be liable for
the loss, damage or delay of such animals, goods or articles, and such a pro-
t Professor of Civil Law, University of Leiden, Netherlands.
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vision shall be a valid defence to any claim in respect thereof, except in cases
where the conditions mentioned in Article 15 (7) apply.'
Various delegates supported the proposal, others opposed it, for various
2reasons.
Answering an objection of the Swedish delegate, Mr. Wilberforce sug-
gested that "the Committee should agree, in principle, that the carrier
was not to be entitled to exclude such liability as would have attached
in any event apart from the nature of the consignment." After further
discussion, the matter was referred to a Working Group, which produced
an entirely new formula. It proposed that the following proviso should be
added to the new Article 23: "provided that this Article shall not apply
to provisions governing loss or damage resulting from wastage in bulk
or weight or from inherent defect, quality or vice of goods carried, in-
cluding live animals."
When calling this an entirely new formula, I did so only with reference
to the original U. K. proposal. In fact the Working Group text was not
new at all, and it was not meant to be so. On the contrary, the Chairman
of the Working Group explained that the text had been taken
verbatim from the Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, which, in turn,
reflected language that had been used for a long time in connection with ad-
miralty contracts, with charter bodies [sic] and with policies of insurance.
As could be expected, the idea of borrowing a legal phrase "well con-
secrated in international law," proved agreeable to the majority of the
Committee, though there was some discussion as to certain terms. How-
ever one problem of material interest raised by the new formula received
little attention. The question raised by the Netherlands delegate, whether
the new provision would permit carriers to exempt themselves from
liability for damages resulting from inherent defects, etc., in case of
negligence, remained unanswered.4 This was the more remarkable because
the original proposal by the U. K. delegate had clearly allowed the per-
mitted exemption clauses to extend to cases of carriers' negligence by
only excluding their validity in case of wilful misconduct.
The text which the Legal Committee at Rio finally adopted was almost
the same as the definitive text of The Hague Protocol, with some inter-
changing of the rather hazy terminology: Instead of speaking of "inherent
defect, quality or vice" (Hague Protocol), the Rio text had "special
nature, latent defect or inherent vice," a mere chassez-croisez of legal
obscurities. At The Hague, the question of whether the new paragraph
should and does allow the carrier to contract away his liability for negli-
gence in case of damage resulting from inherent defect, quality or vice
received considerably more attention. However the discussion did not
result in any conclusion.
A Swedish proposal stated that the carrier would be liable, notwith-
standing an exemption clause as referred to in the new paragraph, "if it
1 1 Rio Session 77 (1953). Article 15 (7) contained a new formula for the willful conduct pro-
vision now contained in Article 25 of the convention.
'Id. at 133. Following the objection from the French delegate directed against the inclusion of
"fragile articles," the UK, delegate dropped this part of the U.K. proposal (137).
a Id. at 172.
4 Id. at 278.
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is proved that he or his servants or agents have caused or contributed to
the loss or damage by negligence."' The Netherlands proposed a somewhat
different text which would not impose on the shipper the burden to prove
the carrier's negligence, but only that of proving that an outside cause
had contributed to the damage. It would then be up to the carrier to
prove, in accordance with Article 20, that he had taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage: "provided that, notwithstanding any such
clause, the carrier shall be liable, subject to the provisions of Article 20,
if it is proved that the damage did not solely result from the special nature,
latent defect or inherent vice of the cargo.' Under this proposal the
shipper could, for example, claim damages on the evidence that the loss
resulting from the inherent defect, etc., was caused by an unwarrantable
delay in delivery of the goods. It would then be up to the carrier to
prove that he should not be held liable for the delay in accordance with
Article 20. Under the Swedish proposal, the shipper would have had to
prove the carrier's negligence with respect to the delay.
A U. S. proposal was aimed at placing the full burden of proof as to
the absence of the carrier's negligence on the carrier. The result was to
be obtained simply by inserting the word "solely" or "exclusively" in
the Rio text, which then would read "provisions governing loss or damage
resulting solely from the special nature, etc."' A similar suggestion was
made by the German delegate!
When a vote was taken on the now joint Swedish-Netherlands proposal
to add a proviso with respect to damages resulting from outside causes,
the proposal was defeated 20 to 8. This still did not make it clear whether
the Conference intended to allow the carrier to exempt himself from
liability for negligences in cases of damages resulting from inherent de-
fect, etc., because the votes against the Swedish-Dutch proviso probably
could as well be explained by a desire to allow the carrier such a con-
tractual freedom, as by the idea that the proviso was not necessary for
excluding the cases of carrier's negligence from the ambit of the new
paragraph. In a last minute attempt to have the Conference at least state
its views on the meaning of the adopted text, the Netherlands delegate
declared that he understood the new paragraph to permit the carrier also
to exclude his liability for negligence in the cases referred to in the Article.
Other delegates were opposed to this interpretation. The U. K. delegate
then intervened by saying that "he wondered what purpose was served
by these declarations." One would think that the courts which in future
must make a choice between the various possible explanations of Article
23, paragraph 2, will have no difficulty in answering that question.
The failure of the Legal Committee and the Conference as a whole to
resolve the question of whether the new paragraph allows a carrier to
contract away his liability for negligence is not surprising when viewed
' I Hague Conference 108 (1955). See also 2 Hague Conference 177.1l Hague Conference 109 (1955). The proposals of Sweden and the Netherlands were later
combined in 1 Hague Conference 1 57.
7Id. at 108.
8Id. at 213. There the words "resulting from" are changed into "to the extent that they result
from." In his explanation Dr. Riese said that as a result, "the same result as that of the combined
proposal of Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands would be achieved in a more simple manner." It
is respectfully submitted that, assuming the German proposal would achieve its desired effect (see
the criticism of the French and Mexican delegates at 213), an important difference as to the burden
of proof would result. This point was also overlooked by thv Mexican delegate at page 211.
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in historical context. As -noted above, the paragraph was adopted from
the Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea which has a long history
of disputed interpretation. In a Protocol to that Convention the High
Contracting Parties were allowed to establish that in the case of damage
resulting from inherent defect, quality or vice, the holder of the bill
of lading may prove the personal fault of the carrier or the fault of his
servants or agents. Various countries' legislative bodies, following the
Brussels Convention, have made it clear that the defense offered by the
legal provision on damage resulting from inherent defect, quality or vice
does not extend to cases of negligence. In those countries where this has
not been done, the question whether the same solution should or should
not be accepted is still a matter of controversy.! This, too, should have
been a warning against using the Brussels formula without clarification.
Curiously, however, most delegates thought that they exercised caution
by borrowing from a well known international convention of long stand-
ing. Well known indeed, but well known, too, as a source of long standing
controversies. To trust blindly the wisdom of the drafters of the Brussels
Convention was probably more an exercise of wishful thinking than of
caution. But even if the borrowed Brussels formula were non-controversial
in its own context, that would not mean that it offers also a clear and sound
solution for the Warsaw Convention. In the Brussels Convention the
provision forms part of the defenses offered to the carrier as a matter
of law. In the Hague Protocol it is an exception to the principle that
the carrier cannot by contract exempt himself wholly or partially from
the liabilities imposed by the Convention. These are quite different things,
but the main difference seems to have escaped the attention of most of
the delegates." The new paragraph 2 of Article 23 does not offer a
defense to the carrier; it merely removes the legal bar of Article 23
against contractual exemption clauses in so far as these are concerned
with loss or damage resulting from inherent defect, quality or vice of
the cargo carried. This means that whenever a contract of carriage con-
tains a provision governing loss or damage resulting from inherent de-
fect, quality or vice, the validity of such a provision cannot be established
by invoking Article 23. In order that the new paragraph have the same
meaning it has in the Brussels Convention, it should be added to Article
20 or perhaps to Article 21. As it is now, Article 23, paragraph 2 is
only concerned with the validity of certain contractual exemption clauses,
whereas the original provision in the Brussels Convention deals with the
legal liability of the carrier. The arguments used in connection with the
legal effect of the provision in the Brussels Convention in case of the
carrier's negligence, are of doubtful value when applied to the construc-
tion of the Hague Protocol.
Suppose the conditions of carriage contained the following clause: "in
no event shall the carrier be liable for damage resulting from inherent
defect, quality or vice of the cargo carried." The only question to be
answered under Article 23, paragraph 2, would be whether this clause
' An extensive and valuable, yet somewhat prejudiced, discussion of this controversy is to be
found in the recent book on the sea carrier's liability. Royer, Hoofdzaken der Vervoerdersaans-
prakelijkheid in bet Zeerecht, Zwolle, 250 (1959).
"A clear example of this confusion is offered by the intervention of the Spanish delegate at
I Hague 211 (1955).
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is a "provision governing damage resulting from inherent defect, quality
or vice of the cargo" as referred to in Article 23, paragraph 2. If so-and
it seems difficult to deny it-paragraph 1 of Article 23 does not apply
to such a clause in the Conditions of Carriage. Assuming for the moment
that, as a consequence, the clause must be held valid, the next thing one
must do is to determine whether the contract cluase should be con-
strued to apply also to cases where negligence on the part of the carrier
has contributed to the damage. More than likely this would be the correct
interpretation in view of the initial words '"in no event."
Should one reason in another manner, by asking first whether the
exemption clause is meant also to apply to cases of carriers' negligence?
If so, and if such application to cases of negligence were determined then
the clause is not a provision as referred to in Article 23, paragraph 2,
"governing damage resulting from the inherent defect, etc." This re-
quires an interpretation of the words "loss or damage resulting from,"
etc. which, to put it mildly, does not impose itself on the basis of an
unprejudiced reading. It is evident that-whatever theory of causality
one prefers-there always will be other facts or circumstances besides
the inherent defect or quality of the goods, will have played an essential
part in causing the damage, whether it be the outside temperature or the
humidity, air pressure or the movement of the goods, etc. Perhaps it will
be argued that damages can only be said to result from the inherent
'defect, etc. of the goods, if they do not at the same time result from
facts or circumstances for which the carrier is liable. Of course, Article
23, paragraph 2 does not say anything about that, but assume for the
moment that this is true. What are the facts or circumstances for which
the carrier is liable under the Warsaw Convention? The answer is given
by Article 18, in which it is said that the carrier shall be liable in the
event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any goods, if the
occurrence which caused the damage took place during the transportation
by air. This does not bring us very far; damage resulting from inherent
defect, etc., for which the carrier would, in principle, be liable under the
Convention, necessarily implies an occurrence for which the carrier is
made liabile by Article 18. Thus the newly added paragraph would have
no meaning at all. It may be pointed out that the same reasoning could
not be followed under the Brussels Convention. There, a number of
well defined positive obligations of duty are imposed upon the carrier.
The proposition that, whenever the carrier's failure to satisfy these obliga-
tions has contributed to the damage, such damage should not be con-
sidered to have resulted from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the
goods, would not take away all effect of the legal defense offered with
respect to such damages. Here again one sees the danger of transplanting
a single phrase of one legal text into an entirely different one.
Perhaps one might argue that the occurrences for which the carrier
bears liability should not be determined by Article 18 alone. However,
this article when read in combination with Article 20, paragraph 1, holds
that the carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
for him or them to take such measures. The carrier becomes liable there-
fore when his failure to take such precautionary measures results in
damage to goods. Applying this to the interpretation of Article 23,
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paragraph 2, one would get this result: damages should only be con-
sidered to result from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the goods,
if no failure on the part of the carrier to take the necessary measures to
avoid the damage has contributed to the damage caused. Further, a pro-
vision in the contract of carriage should only be considered to govern
such damage to the extent it would be applied outside such situations.
Again, this would deprive the new paragraph, introduced to meet
allegedly urgent needs of civil air transportation, of any effect it could
have. In order to prove the validity of the contract provision, the carrier
would have to establish first that the damage did not result from any
failure on his part to take the necessary measures for its avoidance. But
once having done that, he would not need to invoke the contractual
exemption clause, for he would already have offered a complete defense
under Article 20 of the Convention.
Perhaps, to allow some meaning to the new paragraph, one can argue
that it only purports to allow the carrier, by a provision in the contract
of carriage, to shift the burden of proof concerning his negligence to the
claimant when damage resulted from inherent defects, etc. However,
there is nothing in the text to support such a proposition. If one assumes
that the words "resulting from" imply that there should not be a con-
comitant cause for which the carrier is liable, it is hard to understand why
the carrier would have to prove that the damage resulted from an inherent
defect in order to be able to invoke the contract clause. For then the
shipper must prove that negligence of the carrier was also a cause of
the damage. Such an "interpretation" of the new paragraph is simply a
way of saying that one would prefer such a rule. One cannot say that
any other interpretation is less valid. There is nothing nonsensical or
palpably unjust in allowing the parties to contract to let the extra risks
arising from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the goods be borne
by the shipper even in case of negligence of the carrier. Nor is a contract
unjust which provides that goods requiring special care, because of their
nature or inherent defects, to be carried by the carrier without his being
liable for a failure in providing the special care required. Whether this
is the most desirable solution is a different thing. However as long as
the freedom to contract away liability (and the new paragraph purports
to restore that freedom for a restricted number of cases) is not considered
immoral. One cannot say that taking the new paragraph at its face value
would lead to clearly unacceptable results.
Nor does the drafting history lead to a different conclusion. The only
impression one obtains from reading the minutes of the Rio Session of
the Legal Committee and those of the Hague Conference is that of con-
fusion and of unwillingness to take a clear stand. The original proposal
of the new provision, without any doubt, was intended to allow the
carrier to contract away liability in case of his negligence. The French
delegate was opposed to such almost unlimited freedom to contract out
of liability. Further, he pointed to his domestic legislation which only
permitted contractual exclusion of liability with respect to faults of
the flying personnel or to risks of the air.
A Working Group was then appointed to consider precisely from what
types of damage to animals or to perishable goods the carrier should be
entitled to protect himself. It was also to consider the Swedish proposal.
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Presided over by the U. K. delegate, who had made the original proposal,
the Working Group produced the new formula. It failed to indicate the
effects intended in case of carrier negligence.' Afterwards, proposals were
made to add a proviso making it clear that, notwithstanding an exemption
clause as referred to in the new paragraph, the carrier would be liable if
it was proved that he had been negligent or had not taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage. These proposals were defeated. It is true,
that various delegates had said that they thought the addition superfluous.
But others expressed a different opinion. An attempt to get a clear state-
ment of intention failed; the question was "wilfully" left for the courts
to interpret. This means that the courts, in the absence of any guidance
to be obtained from the drafting history, can only look to the text of
the paragraph within the context of the Convention. The fact that the
wording of the new paragraph was taken from the Brussels Convention
does not mean that it should be construed in the same way as in the
Brussels Convention. It plays a different part in the Warsaw Convention
from the part it plays in the Brussels Convention. Since the arguments
used in attaching one or the other construction to the provision in the
Brussels Convention have no bearing on the interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention, it is also different. The conclusion must be that, as a con-
sequence of the added paragraph, Article 23 does not apply to exemption
clauses "governing damages resulting from inherent defect, quality or
vice of the cargo," irrespective of whether negligence on the part of the
carrier has been a concomitant cause of the damage.
Does this mean that the new paragraph has established the validity of
this limited group of exemption clauses. It certainly does not say so.
What it does say is only that paragraph 1 of Article 23 shall not apply
to these clauses. So their alleged invalidity cannot be based on that pro-
vision of the Convention. But whether it could be based on principles of
applicable national law is a different question. Since the Convention itself
does not contain any other general provision concerning the validity of
exemption clauses, e.g., a provision which would exclude their applica-
tion in case of wilful misconduct (Article 25 as amended by the Hague
Protocol only deals with the applicability of the limits of liability specified
in Article 22), one must assume that the validity of contractual pro-
visions that are not forbidden by Article 23 may be governed by
the applicable national law. True, the unification of the law-the aim
of the Warsaw Convention-is somewhat weakened by this interpretation
of Article 23, paragraph 2, but there are other fields which the makers
of the Convention have left to the national laws. A discussion of what
will be the applicable law in the various national legal systems as to the
validity of exemption clauses with respect to the carriage of goods would
go far beyond the scope of this essay.'
So far, little has been said about the exact meaning of the words
"inherent defect, quality or vice of the cargo carried." The French and
Spanish texts have "nature ou vice propre des marchandises transport~es,"
"la naturaleza o vicio propio de las mercancias transportadas." As stated
above, the words were taken from the Brussels Convention, that is to
'I Rio Session 138 (1953).
1 See a discussion in Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law, $§ 230-49
(19S4).
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say, the English words were taken from the English text (Hague Rules)
of which the Brussels Convention was a translation. Curiously however,
the French text ("nature ou vice propre") differs from the authentic
French text of the Brussels Convention, which has "vice cache, nature
sp~ciale ou vice propre." The simplified French and Spanish texts were
partly based on the thought that "a vice cach6" is always a "vice propre"
so that it was not necessary to mention it separately. It was reasoned that,
since it was difficult to say goods such as livestock and perishables have
a more "special" nature than other goods, the adjustive "special" should
be eliminated. The result is that, in the language of the Brussels Conven-
tion (French)," the terminology of the Hague Protocol is somewhat
different from the Brussels text. According to the final clauses of the
Hague Protocol the text in the French language shall prevail in the case
of any inconsistency ("en cas de divergence") among the three texts.
This does not mean, however, that the interpretation of Article 4, para-
graph 2, subparagraph m of the Brussels Convention could be of no
significance to the interpretation of Article 23, paragraph 2 of the
Warsaw Convention. Indeed the phrasing of the latter provision was
clearly and consciously inspired by the terminology of the Brussels Con-
vention, on the assumption that after thirty years the interpretation of
that Convention would have been sufficiently established by the courts
and legal scholars.
It is generally accepted with respect to Article 4, paragraph 2, sub-
paragraph m of the Brussels Convention that, in order to determine
whether an inherent defect, quality or vice of the goods has caused or
contributed to the damage, it is necessary to establish the degree of care
required of the carrier, on the basis of Article 3 of the Convention. Only
such damage which would have occurred whether or not the carrier gave
all reasonable care required in carrying this kind of goods, may be said
to have resulted from the quality or inherent defects of the goods. It
is contingent on the assumption that the damage would not have occurred
if the goods had been without such quality or inherent defect. Whether
the "quality" or an "inherent defect" played a relevant part in causing
the damage largely depends on the amount of care demanded from the
carrier in the transportation of this kind of goods. Article 3 of the
Brussels Convention contains a lengthy description of the care required
from the carrier; the Warsaw Convention does not contain such a pro-
vision. Because of this and because the new Warsaw paragraph only pur-
ports to offer the carrier the chance to limit his liability, it becomes neces-
sary to follow a somewhat different line of thought.
The new provision was introduced in view of the extra risks involved
in carrying cargo such as perishables or livestock. Whenever transporta-
tion of certain goods, because of their quality, inherent defects or vice,
requires special care from the carrier in order that the goods may safely
arrive at their destination, Article 23 does not forbid the carrier from
contracting away his liability for failing to provide the special care re-
quired. It could be said that the special nature of the goods is again
a According to the Minutes at 213, the U.K. delegate would have "recalled that it was the
English text of the Brussels Protocol [sic] which was authentic." It seems improbable that this has
actually been said, as the Brussels Convention has only been made up in one language-French.
Probably it was only pointed out that the original text on which the Brussels Convention was based
(the "Hague Rules" of 1921) was in English.
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emphasized, although the word "special" was intentionally removed from
the text. Actually, there must be some deviation from what is normal
as to goods carried by air. If not, the door is opened to any exemption
clause for the carriage of any goods, since the quality or nature of the
goods is always an essential element in determining the kind of damages
which the goods may suffer. If a shipment has been handled roughly and
arrives in pieces, it is because of the breakable nature of the shipment.
Had it been a shipment of gold, there would be no damage. The quality
or inherent defect can only be said to have contributed to the damage,
if normal cargo, not requiring special care, would not have suffered
damage.
If one accepts this interpretation, one gets the following results. If a
shipment arrives in damaged condition and the Conditions of Carriage
contained a provision negating any liability whatsoever for damages
resulting from inherent defect, quality or vice, the carrier can plead
that he had taken all necessary measurements to avoid the damage
(Article 20). He can also argue that the shipment required special care
in order to arrive in good condition and that the damage was a con-
sequence of some failure with respect to that special care. His latter
plea will be accompanied by a claim that such comes within the ambit of
the exemption clause permitted by paragraph 2 of Article 23.
In many cases the kind of damage for which compensation is claimed
will make a prima facie case for applicability of the exemption clause.
That will be particularly so with the carriage of livestock or perishables,
the two categories of goods for which the provision was especially in-
tended. (At a certain stage of the discussion the clause was limited to
these two categories.)
The burden of proof as to the exemption clause being applicable to
certain damage is on the carrier. Could the contractual provision be
phrased in such a way as to shift the burden of proof to the party claim-
ing damages? It is believed that the new paragraph 2 does not allow that.
The general rule is that exemption clauses are invalid. The carrier who
invokes an exemption clause must prove that it falls within the exception
of the second paragraph.
It would be foolish to say that the interpretation here suggested is the
only one which can be defended reasonably. Already at the Hague Con-
ference different interpretations have been offered. The addition of the
new paragraph to Article 23 introduces a source of litigation, without
offering any sure protection to the carrier. The drafters of the new
provision had hoped to solve all problems by borrowing their formula
from an existing Convention, a kind of legal escapism which interna-
tional conferences occasionally indulge in. For a number of delegates the
formula was attractive because of its brevity. Verbosity certainly is a
weakness in a legal text, a weakness most keenly felt perhaps by jurists
from Latin tradition. But that does not mean that a short text is neces-
sarily a sound one. Ironically, in this case the text which was preferred
for its shortness was taken from that typical-and certainly not the most
admirable-example of Anglo-Saxon draftmanship, the Brussels Con-
vention on Bills of Lading. The analogous provisions in the continental
conventions on the carriage of goods by railroad (the Berne Convention,
usually called the C.I.M.) and on the carriage of goods by road (the
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Geneva Convention of 1956, abbreviated as C.M.R.) are more lengthy,
though more explicit. 4 They were drafted by continental lawyers in the
continental legal tradition. If the new paragraph had to be taken from an
existing convention, it might have been better to use the old Berne Con-
vention on carriage by railroad as a model. It had already served as such
when the provisions on the carriage of goods (especially those on the
traffic documents) were drafted at the original Warsaw Convention.
In all fairness to the drafters of the Brussels Convention, it should
be pointed out that on this particular point that Convention was better
than its partial imitation in The Hague Protocol. This was so not only
because the Hague text was based on a different principle (validity of
certain exemption clauses) from that of the Brussels formula (legal
defense), but also because not all of the relevant provisions of the Brussels
Convention have been incorporated into the Hague Protocol. Thus, the
Brussels Convention contains a definition of "goods," by virtue of which
"live animals" are excluded from the application of the Convention
(Article 1, subsection c). "Livestock" being one of the categories of
goods for which the new paragraph to Article 23 was thought necessary,
this deviation from the Brussels Convention is especially striking. More-
over, Article VI of that Convention gives the carrier full freedom to
contract away all liability with respect to shipments other than "ordinary
commercial shipments made in the ordinary course of trade . . . , where
14 The Berne Convention (C.I.M.) contains the following provisions on this subject (Art. 28):
"Le Chemin de fer n'est pas responsable des dommages qui r~sultent d'une ou plusieurs
des causes ci-apris: [ . . .]
d. danger particulier, soit de perte totale ou partielle, soit d'avarie, notamment par
bris, rouille, d&6trioration intirieure et spontanie, coulage extraordinaire, dessica-
tion, d~perdition, auxquelles certaines marchandises sont expos~es par des causes inh6-
rentes a leur nature; [ . .
f. danger particulier que le transport entraine pour les animaux vivants; etc. [see
also g.]
§ 2. Lorsque, eu 6gard aux circonstances de fait, un dommage a pu r~sulter d'une ou
plusieurs de ces causes, il y a pr~somption qu'il en r~sulte, i moins que l'ayant droit
n'ait fait la preuve qu'il n'en risulte pas."
The Geneva Convention (C.M.R.) contains the following relevant provisions:
"Art. 17:
4. Compte tenu de 'article 18, paragraphs 2 1 5, le transporteur est dicharg6 de sa
responsabilit6 lorsque la perte ou l'avarie r~sulte des risques particuliers inh~rents i
I'un des faits suivants ou a plusieurs d'entre eux: [ . . . ]
d. Nature de certaines marchandises exposdes, par des causes inhirentes I cette
nature m~me, soit i perte totale ou partielle, soi i avarie, notamment par bris, rouille,
d~t&ioration interne et spontanfe, dessication, coulage, d6chet normal ou action de
la vermine et des rongeurs; [ . . . ]
f. Transport d'animaux vivants.
5. Si, en vertu du pr~sent article, le transporteur ne rfpond pas de certains des facteurs
qui ont caus6 le dommage, sa responsabilit6 n'est engag~e que dans la proportion off
les facteurs dont il r~pond en vertu du pr~sent article ont contribu6 au dommage.
"Art. 18:
2. [similar to Art. 28, para. 2, of the Berne Convention]
4. Si le transport est effectu6 au moyen d'un v~hicule am6nag6 en vu de soustraire
les marchandises i l'influence de la chaleur, du froid, des variations de tempfrature ou
de l'humidit6 de I'air, le transporteur ne peut invoquer le b~n6fice de I'article 17,
paragraphe 4,d, que s'il fournit la preuve que toutes les mesures lui incombant, compte
tenu des circonstances, ont 6t6 prises en ce qui concerne le choix, l'entretien et I'emploi
de ces am~nagements et qu'il s'est conform6 aux instructions sp~ciales qui ont pu lui
itre donnies.
5. Le transporteur ne peut invoquer le b6nffice de l'article 17, paragraphe 4,f, que
s'il fournit la preuve que toutes les mesures lui incombant normalement, compte tenu
des circonstances, ont k6 prises et qu'il s'est conform6 aux instructions spciales qui
ont pu lui &re donn~es."
